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Abstract 
Even though conspiracy theories are diverse, they are typically construed as a 
homogeneous phenomenon. Based on classic theorizations of conspiracy theories by Popper 
(1945; 2002) and Moscovici (1987), we propose to distinguish between belief in upward 
conspiracy theories (i.e., targeting relatively powerful groups) and downward conspiracy 
theories (i.e., targeting relatively powerless groups). The former are theorized as power-
challenging beliefs and the latter are theorized as being underpinned by conservative 
ideology. Across three studies conducted in Belgium (Total N = 2363), we show that these 
two types of conspiracy beliefs indeed relate differently to power-challenging attitudes (i.e., 
political extremism, feelings of leadership breakdown) and conservative ideology. 
Specifically, upward conspiracy beliefs were characterized by a U-shaped relationship with 
political orientation (i.e., an “extremism” bias), and a strong relationship with feelings of 
leadership breakdown. By contrast, downward conspiracy beliefs were strongly associated 
with conservative ideology. Both types of conspiracy beliefs were, however, positively 
correlated.  
 Keywords: conspiracy theories, ideology, Popper, Moscovici, conspiracy mindset, 
power, conservatism 
 Word count: 10832  
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A Power Challenging Theory of Society, or a Conservative Mindset? Upward and 
Downward Conspiracy Theories as Ideologically Distinct Beliefs 
Conspiracy theories (CTs) can be defined as beliefs that evil groups secretly plot to 
achieve nefarious goals (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). CTs blame a variety of groups, such as 
powerful economic groups (e.g., banks or pharmaceutical companies, van Prooijen et al., 
2015), scientific communities (e.g., climate or vaccine scientists, Hornsey & Fielding, 2018), 
governments and intelligence services (Brotherton et al., 2013), ethnic or religious groups 
(e.g., Jews, Kofta & Sedek, 2005; Muslims, Uenal, 2016), or ideological groups (e.g., gender 
activists, Marchlewska et al., 2019). Nevertheless, CTs are typically construed as a 
homogeneous phenomenon, and belief in CTs is often conceptualized as a “mindset”, or a 
stable, individual propensity to believe that conspiracies occur (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013; 
Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Lantian, 2016; but see Sutton & Douglas, 2020). 
In the current research, we add nuance to this claim and argue that many CTs can be 
distinguished as upward (i.e., implicating relatively powerful groups such as bankers, 
governments, or industrial groups), and downward (i.e., implicating relatively powerless 
groups such as Muslims, migrants, or LGBT people). We examine the predictors of these 
different types of conspiracy beliefs, arguing that belief in upward CTs will be predicted by 
power-challenging beliefs, whereas belief in downward CTs will be predicted by 
conservative ideology.  
The “Single Construct” Approach of Conspiracy Theories and its Limitations 
 In one of the first quantitative investigations of conspiracy beliefs, Goertzel (1994) 
observed that beliefs in (apparently) unrelated CTs were positively correlated. This finding 
has been replicated numerous times (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013; Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2014; Lukic et al., 2019; Swami et al., 2011; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007; 
Wood et al., 2012), to the point that it has been identified as the most robust finding in all 
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research on CTs (Sutton & Douglas, 2014). To account for this finding, authors have 
suggested the existence of a generic belief system underpinning the endorsement of CTs, 
which has been given names such as monological belief system (Goertzel, 1994), generic 
conspiracist beliefs (Brotherton et al., 2013), or conspiracy mentality (Bruder et al., 2013; 
Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Moscovici, 1987). Social scientists typically construe belief in CTs 
as a relatively homogeneous phenomenon which can be captured by measures of a 
“conspiracist mindset” (Swami et al., 2017; Douglas et al., 2019).  
 However, like any generic approach to a multifaceted phenomenon, this approach has 
limitations (Sutton & Douglas, 2014; 2020). First, it tends to conceal the diversity of beliefs 
labelled as “conspiracy theories” (Harambam & Aupers, 2016). Second, it implicitly assumes 
that the endorsement of any CT operates via similar mechanisms (e.g., Douglas et al., 2017; 
van Prooijen, 2019). As a result, research testing the proposal that the endorsement of 
different types of CTs might be driven by distinct mechanisms is scarce (see however 
Sternisko et al., 2020, for an insightful need-based approach that outlines a distinction 
between different types of CTs, underpinned by distinct psychological motives). 
 Last, another important limitation of the “single construct” approach to CTs is that 
there seems to be a variety of conceptualizations of its core component, namely, the 
“conspiracist mindset” (see Douglas et al., 2019 for a review). It is often simply defined as an 
individual predisposition to believe in CTs. However, such a definition has little explanatory 
power, and potentially leads to circular reasoning. Indeed, the main argument for the 
existence of a “conspiracist mindset” is the observation that individuals who endorse one CT 
tend to endorse others. Thus, if one endorses the aforementioned definition, explaining that a 
person believes in a CT because he/she has a general tendency to believe in CTs may not be a 
substantial theoretical contribution (see Sutton & Douglas, 2020 for other critiques of the 
conspiracy mindset). Thus, up to now, the “conspiracy mindset” appears more as a robust 
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empirical finding, that is usually interpreted as an underlying trait, than an explanatory 
variable. 
 In contrast to the “single construct” approach to CTs, some authors have proposed a 
distinction between CTs involving authorities and CTs primarily involving stigmatized 
cultural or religious groups (e.g., Campion-Vincent, 2005; Dyrendal et al., 2018; Oliver & 
Wood, 2014; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007). In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
throughout history, cultural minorities and foreigners have been the target of numerous 
accusations of conspiracy (Campion-Vincent, 2005; Moscovici, 1987). In comparison, CTs 
accusing “enemies from within” (e.g., government, intelligence agencies) seem to be a 
relatively recent phenomenon, whose origin can be traced back to the French Revolution 
(Campion-Vincent, 2005). Inspired by this research, we propose that CTs can be 
conceptualized as upward or downward depending on the alleged conspirator.  
Upward and Downward Conspiracy Theories 
 We propose that upward CTs implicate relatively powerful groups (e.g., bankers, 
governments, pharmaceutical companies) and that downward CTs implicate relatively 
powerless social groups (e.g., Muslims, migrants, LGBT+ people). Since CTs are 
intrinsically related to a subjective perception of power (e.g., Brotherton, 2014; Moscovici, 
1987; Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020), we propose to primarily anchor this distinction not in 
perceived power, but in objective power asymmetries within society. Following the definition 
of social power as “asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations” (Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008, p. 361), we propose that downward CTs implicate groups (or associations 
who represent these groups such as lobbies or NGOs) whose access to these valued resources 
is restricted – notably because of discrimination. As for upward CTs, they implicate groups 
who have privileged access to these resources. As we will see, distinguishing CTs based on 
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objective rather than subjective power enables us to develop a more fine-grained reflection on 
how objective and subjective power are articulated with regards to CTs. 
 This distinction emphasizes the differences between two diverging theoretical 
approaches to belief in CTs: the conspiracy theory of society (Popper, 1945; 2002) and the 
conspiracy mentality (Moscovici, 1987, 2020). Both approaches propose that accusations of 
conspiracy are underpinned by a generic belief system. They further agree that conspiracy 
believers perceive the alleged conspirators not as a collection of individuals, but as 
monolithic entities, and that they overly rely on intentional interpretation of social events. 
However, Popper initiated the idea that CTs primarily target relatively powerful groups, 
whereas Moscovici initiated an approach centered on individuals’ desire to preserve their 
ingroup against threatening outgroups (and notably, discriminated minorities). In contrast to 
Popper therefore, Moscovici argued that alleged conspirators need not be powerful.  
The Conspiracy Theory of Society and Upward Conspiracy Theories 
 In 1962, Popper (2002) described the conspiracy theory of society as the belief that 
social problems (e.g., economic depressions, wars, shortages) are intentionally perpetuated by 
powerful groups who benefit from these problems. This idea is rooted in his earlier criticism 
of what he pejoratively called the “vulgar Marxists” (Popper, 1945, p. 93). According to 
“vulgar Marxists”, Popper says, “Marxism lays bare the sinister secrets of social life by 
revealing the hidden motives […] which actuate the powers behind the scenes of history, 
powers that cunningly and consciously create war, depression, unemployment […].” (p. 93). 
We might note that in reality, no group has enough power to entirely control the course of 
complex social events (Bale, 2007; Keeley, 1999; Popper, 1966). Thus, on the psychological 
level, upward CTs appear to be about attributing even more power to powerful groups than 
they actually have.   
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 This view has significantly influenced social psychological scholarship on CTs. For 
example, in a recent interdisciplinary review of literature, Douglas et al. (2019) proposed to 
define CTs as “attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political 
events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors” (p. 4). 
Directly inspired by Popper’s work, Imhoff and Bruder (2014) have described “conspiracy 
mentality” as a generalized political attitude that challenges power structures by blaming 
negative events on powerful groups acting in secret1. This political attitude is associated with 
prejudice against powerful groups (e.g., bankers, Americans, Jews) but not prejudice against 
powerless groups (e.g., Muslims or Gypsies). Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) further proposed 
that CTs are intrinsically related to feelings of relative powerlessness (that is, compared to the 
conspirators’ power). 
 This perspective therefore proposes that CTs are power-challenging phenomena. This 
view has been supported by research showing that CTs are endorsed to a greater extent by 
people on the losing side of power asymmetries (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). For example, 
after an election, the losing side typically accuses the winning side of cheating (Uscinski & 
Parent, 2014; Uscinski et al., 2016) – a finding spectacularly instantiated in the 2020 US 
elections. Moreover, many CTs are typically endorsed by members of disadvantaged groups, 
such as disadvantaged ethnic or cultural minorities (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et 
al., 1999; Freeman & Bentall, 2017; Goertzel, 1994; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; van Prooijen, 
2016; van Prooijen, Staman, & Krouwel, 2018), people experiencing economic insecurity 
(Freeman & Bentall, 2017), or people with lower educational attainment (Douglas et al., 
2016; Goertzel, 1994; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; van Prooijen, 2016). This view also finds 
support in research showing that beliefs in CTs is associated with willingness to engage in 
 
1 Note that this definition of the conspiracy mentality differs from its original conceptualization by Moscovici 
(1987) developed in the next section. 
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violent collective action (Imhoff, Dierterle, & Lamberty, 2020; Jolley & Paterson, 2020), and 
political extremism (van Prooijen et al., 2015; Krouwel et al., 2017; Imhoff et al., 2020). 
Regarding the latter, it is worth noting that according to Popper (2002), far left and far right 
totalitarian regimes are founded on conspiratorial thinking. 
The Conspiracy Mentality and Downward Conspiracy Theories 
 Despite some similarities, Moscovici’s (1987) understanding of what he was the first to 
name the “conspiracy mentality” differs from Popper’s view. According to Moscovici, CTs 
are rooted in the threat that minorities (whether religious, ethnic, or political) pose to the 
majority’s most paramount norms, beliefs, and values. Importantly, in his view minorities 
need not hold actual power (nor, of course, to be actually conspiring) to be accused of 
conspiring against the majority. Rather, the conspiracy mentality projects power and 
malevolence on minorities that threaten the majority, even when these minorities are 
objectively powerless (e.g., immigrants). Thus, downward CTs can be characterized by an 
attribution of power to objectively powerless groups.  
 This account differs from Popper’s view on key aspects. First and foremost, the power 
asymmetry between the conspirators (a minority) and the victims of the conspiracy (the 
majority) is opposite to the one postulated by the conspiracy theory of society. Specifically, 
in Moscovici’s view a CT is typically (but not necessarily) a belief held by the powerful 
against the powerless. Second, and relatedly, CTs do not aim to challenge power structures, 
but at something rather the opposite. Specifically, CTs challenge the preservation of the 
ingroup’s norms, values, and beliefs. In other words, CTs are underpinned by conservative 
concerns.  
 Moscovici’s perspective also finds support in the empirical literature on CTs. Indeed, 
many authors have reported that beliefs in CTs are associated with a conservative ideology 
(Dieguez et al., 2015; Featherstone et al., 2019; Galliford & Furnham, 2017; Hart & Graether, 
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2018; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Miller et al. 2016; Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018; van der Linden, 
2015; van der Linden et al., 2020; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007; however, for an 
example of “left-wing bias”, see Krouwel et al., 2017). Unsurprisingly, this view garners 
particularly strong support in research pertaining to CTs targeting stigmatized groups – which 
were the main concern of Moscovici’s reflection on the conspiracy mentality. For example, 
CTs blaming migrants (Jolley et al., 2019), Muslims (Dyrendal et al., 2018; Swami et al., 
2017; Uenal, 2016), gender activists (Marchlewska et al., 2019), Jews (Bilewicz et al., 2013; 
Dyrendal et al., 2018; Greszniak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009; Kofta & Sedek, 2005), or Black 
Americans (Miller et al., 2016; Richey, 2017; Pasek et al., 2015) are all strongly related to a 
conservative ideology. Furthermore, CTs targeting cultural minorities seems to be related to 
conspiracy stereotypes towards cultural minorities (Kofta & Sedek, 2005; Uenal, 2016), 
feelings of symbolic and realistic intergroup threat (Uenal, 2016), and willingness to 
discriminate against the allegedly conspiring outgroups (Bilewicz et al., 2013). Thus, many 
disadvantaged groups seem to be targeted by conspiracy beliefs; These examples largely 
follow our conceptualization of downward CTs and mitigate the idea that CTs necessarily 
target powerful groups. Note that Jews appear as an exception, as this group suffers from 
discrimination but is also characterized by high economic and social achievements in many 
countries (e.g., Mendelssohn, 2015; Muller, 2011). Thus, this group appears to be ambiguous 
with regards to the distinction between upward and downward CTs. It might be the subject of 
upward CTs or downward CTs, depending on the context. 
Overview of the Research 
 The distinction between upward and downward CTs is rooted in the existence of two 
trends of research in the study of CTs. One construes CTs as resulting from a power-
challenging belief system. The second construes CTs as the expression of conservative 
concerns regarding the preservation of one’s ingroup. In the current research, we examined 
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the extent to which belief in upward and downward CTs relate differently to power 
challenging and conservative attitudes.  
 Belief in upward and downward CTs were measured through inventories of conspiracy 
beliefs targeting, respectively, relatively powerful groups (e.g., banks, governments, 
pharmaceutical companies) or relatively powerless groups (e.g., Muslims, immigrants, 
LGBT+ people, feminists). Power-challenging attitudes were measured through political 
extremism (Studies 1-3) and feelings of leadership breakdown (Studies 2-3). Note that 
political extremism should not be considered a power challenging attitude in every context. 
However, the far right is virtually non-existent in the political arena of French speaking 
Belgium (RTBF, 2019) – probably in part because French speaking Belgian media have an 
agreement never to invite representatives of the far right (de Jonge, 2020). As for the far left, 
despite its relative success, the PTB (Belgian Workers’ Party), “only” came in fourth at the 
last federal elections (RTBF, 2019). More generally, Belgium has a proportional 
representation system dominated by both center-to-moderate right and center-to-moderate 
left; in such a system, extreme policies are less likely to be adopted given that reaching a 
simple majority demands to assemble a broad coalition (Amy, 2000). For these reasons, we 
consider that in the French speaking Belgian context, both far left and far right political 
extremism can be considered as a power-challenging attitude (this would not be the case in a 
country ruled by a radical right or left party). Finally, conservative attitudes were assessed 
using two measures of conservatism, namely, the left/right scale, and the social and economic 
dimensions of conservatism.  
 Across all studies, we hypothesized that belief in upward CTs and downward CTs 
would relate significantly differently to conservative and power challenging attitudes. 
Specifically, we expected belief in upward CTs to be more associated with power challenging 
attitudes than downward CTs, and belief in downward CTs to be more associated with  
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conservative attitudes than upward CTs. Studies 2-3 also provided an opportunity to examine 
how upward and downward conspiracy beliefs are related to a measure of the conspiracist 
mindset, namely, the single item conspiracist beliefs scale (Lantian et al., 2016). 
 Note that the results reported do not follow the pre-registered hypotheses. This is 
because the current article went through multiple revisions and rewritings and the content of 
the analyses evolved as a result of this process. We still report results in the form of 
confirmatory hypotheses for the sake of readability.  
Study 1 
 All materials, raw data, and analyses scripts for all studies can be accessed at the 
following address: https://osf.io/utvf3/ 
 
In Study 1, we measured conservative attitudes using the left-right scale, as it is one of the 
most convenient and commonly used measurement of conservatism (Bauer et al., 2017; 
Everett, 2013). Given the limitations of the left-right scale (Bauer et al., 2017), we also 
included measures of the economic and social components of conservatism (Everett, 2013) to 
examine how these subcomponents relate to both types of conspiracy beliefs. 
To measure power challenging attitudes, we also relied on the left-right scale, as it 
also enables to measure political extremism. Indeed, a U-shaped relation between political 
orientation and a given variable shows that this variable is more prevalent at the political 
extremes. To capture such a U-shaped relation, we relied on quadratic regressions, as well as 
the two lines test proposed by Simonsohn (2018). 
We first hypothesized that upward and downward CTs would have a significantly 
different relation with conservatism, as captured by the left-right scale (H1). Specifically, we 
expected downward CTs to be positively associated with a right-wing political orientation 
(H2), more than upward CTs. We expected the same pattern for the dimensions of 
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conservatism (H3-4). Regarding power challenging attitudes, we expected beliefs in upward 
and downward CTs to have significantly different relations with political extremism (H5). 




Nine hundred and sixty two Belgian residents completed the online questionnaire, out 
of which 786 remained (326 women, 460 men; Mage = 54.5 years old, ranging from 18 to 90, 
SD = 15.8 years) after excluding those who did not answer the attention check (“Please tick 
box 7”), or seriousness check (“did you answer honestly to this questionnaire, took the time 
to read the questions, without being distracted?” Y/N) correctly, or were under 18 years old. 
Students were 6.5% of the sample (N = 48), 30.1% were employees (N = 238), 7.8% were 
self-employed (N = 62), 40.8% were retired (N = 322, this overrepresentation is addressed in 
Studies 2 and 3), 4.4% were unemployed (N = 34), and the remaining 10.4% (N = 82) ticked 
the box “other”. The mean for political orientation was 5.16 (1 = far left, 11 = far right; SD = 
2.43). For a given power of .90, the sample size enabled us to detect an effect size of r = .11 
with two tailed tests. 
Materials and Procedure  
 Our questionnaire was uploaded on the LimeSurvey platform. Participants were 
recruited in October 2017 using a sponsored advertisement on Facebook. The study was 
presented as “A study about Belgian society”. On the first page of the questionnaire, 
participants read a short text thanking them for their participation. They were informed that 
by continuing, they gave their consent to participate in the study and that an anonymized 
version of the data would be uploaded on an open-access platform for other researchers. The 
scales were completed in the following order: social and economic conservatism scale, 
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conspiracy beliefs scale, perceived intergroup symbolic and realistic threat, and 
sociodemographic questions. 
Upward (α = .84) and Downward (r = .40) Conspiracy Beliefs. Five items referred 
to CTs involving powerful groups (e.g., “the press is secretly controlled by the elites to 
manufacture consent about the status quo while giving the illusion of democratic debate”; 
“Some pharmaceutical groups encourage the spreading of diseases because they have the 
monopoly on the treatments”). Two items measured the endorsement of CTs involving 
relatively powerless groups, namely, Muslims and LGBTI+ people (see European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2012; Unia, 2019; for data regarding, respectively, the 
discrimination experienced by LGBT+ people and immigrants in Belgium): “Some Muslim 
organizations […] are secretly plotting to impose Islam in Europe”; “The LGBTI lobby 
pretends to be promoting equality, but its actual goal is […] to destroy traditional family 
norms.” Participants answered to those items on a scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 
10 (totally agree). Confirmatory factor analyses using the R package “lavaan” (Rosseel et al., 
2019) suggested that the two-factor structure fitted the data, Chisq/df = 6.23, p < .001, CFI = 
.97,TLI= .95, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = 0.03, significantly better than a single-factor structure, 
Chisq/df = 10.52, CFI = .93,TLI= .90, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = 0.06, χ2 difference = 66.29, p 
< .001.  
 Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2013). This 12-item scale 
assesses both economic (5 items) and social (7 items) dimensions of conservatism (alphas are 
reported below because the factor analyses unexpectedly returned a three-factor structure). 
Participants are asked to indicate how positive or negative they felt about various topics that 
reflect attitudes towards economic conservatism (e.g., free market, business, welfare state 
[reversed]) and social conservatism (e.g., traditional marriage, abortion [reversed]), on a scale 
ranging from 1 (very negative) to 11 (very positive). Since the scale was developed in the 
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North American context, we translated the items in French, and replaced some items (e.g., 
gun ownership, fiscal responsibility) with others more appropriate to the Belgian context 
(e.g., gay marriage [reversed], religious schools). The need for contextual adaptation was 
mentioned by the author of the scale. Confirmatory Factor Analysis returned an 
unsatisfactory fit of the two-factor structure, CFI = .62, TLI = .52, RMSEA = .16. On a 
randomly selected half of the sample, we carried out Principal Components analysis that 
returned a three-factor structure: social conservatism (“Traditional Value”, “Religion”, 
“Patriotism” and “Traditional Marriage”, α = .79), economic conservatism (“Free trade”, 
“Limited government” and “Business”, α = .68), and a third factor which we labeled 
“hostility against redistribution” (HAR: “Welfare State”, “Welfare Subsidies”, both reversed, 
α = .65). We carried out a Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the other half of the sample, 
which returned an acceptable fit of the model, Chisq/df = 4.51, CFI = 0.93, TLI = .90, 
RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .05 (detailed analyses are available on the OSF).  
 The last page consisted of sociodemographic questions: gender, age, political 
orientation (1 = far left, 11 = far right) occupation and nationality. Before completing the 
questionnaire, participants were able to write an open-ended comment. The first author’s e-
mail address was provided in case participants had questions about the research. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations are displayed in Table 1. For all of the 
hierarchical regressions, reversing the order of the blocks of the models did not affect any of 
the results (see supplementary material on the OSF). 
Table 1 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 1) 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Conservatism 
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First, we sought to examine if political conservatism (i.e., the linear term of political 
orientation) had significantly different relationships with upward (i.e., targeting relatively 
powerful groups) and downward (i.e., targeting relatively powerless groups) conspiracy 
beliefs.  
Following the method of Judd and colleagues (2017), we computed as a dependent 
variable a new variable consisting of the difference between belief in upward and downward 
CTs (see Table 2 for summary of these analyses, Studies 1-3). The rationale is the following: 
when examining the effect of a predictor (e.g., political conservatism) on this DV, the null 
hypothesis is that the two types of theories are equally associated to this predictor. Hence, 
this is an ideal way to examine whether they reflect different social psychological 
phenomena. Note that this method actually consists of an interaction analysis, as it examines 
if the relation between the independent variables and conspiracy belief is moderated by the 
type of conspiracy belief. Thus, we will refer to this method as interaction analysis hereafter. 
The regression revealed a significant effect of political conservatism, B = -0.50, t = -
14.44, p < .001 (see Table 2, Study 1, Model 1). Hence, congruent with H1, belief in upward 
and downward CTs relate significantly differently to participants’ conservatism, as captured 
by the left-right scale.  
Table 2  
Interaction analyses. Difference between Upward and Downward Conspiracy Beliefs as 
Dependent Variable (Studies 1-3) 
 We further expected that downward CTs would be associated with a right-wing 
political orientation, more so than upward CTs. To test this, we carried out hierarchical 
regression. Political orientation was introduced at Step 1, and the quadratic term was 
introduced at Step 2 (see next section). Corroborating H2, we found a strong linear relation 
between belief in downward CTs and political orientation, B = 0.49, t = 14.51, p < .001, R2 = 
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.21 (see Table 3), so that right wing participants were more likely to endorse this type of CT. 
By contrast, we found no linear relationship between belief in upward CTs and political 
orientation, B = -.02, t = -0.57, p = .57. 
As expected from H3, beliefs in upward and downward CTs had significantly different 
relationships with the social component of conservatism, B = -0.18, t = -4.26, p < .001 (see 
Table 2, Study 1, Model 2). Specifically, belief in downward CTs were more strongly 
associated with social conservatism, r = .41, 95% CI [.35; .46], p < .001, than upward CTs, r 
= .14, 95% CI [.07; .21], p < .001. The relations were also significantly different for the 
economic dimension of conservatism, B = -0.26, t = -6.15, p < .001. Belief in downward CTs 
were positively associated with this dimension, r = .21, 95% CI [.14; .27], p < .001, whereas 
belief in upward CTs were slightly and negatively correlated, r = -.12, 95% CI [-.06; -.19], p 
< .001. Finally, belief in upward and downward CTs also had distinct relations with hostility 
against redistribution, B = -0.25, t = -7.25, p < .001, so that belief in downward CTs was 
more strongly associated with this dimension, r = .36, 95% CI [.30; .42], p < .001, than 
upward CTs, r = .08, 95% CI [.01; .15], p = .018. Thus, congruent with H4 and our results 
regarding the left-right scale, we found that all dimensions of conservatism were significantly 
more associated with downward CTs than with upward CTs.  
Table 3  
Hierarchical Regressions for Belief in Upward and Downward CTs (Study 1) 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Political Extremism 
As for political extremism, we expected that upward CTs and downward CTs would 
have a significantly different relationship with political extremism (i.e., the quadratic term of 
political orientation). Surprisingly, in the interaction analysis, we found no significant effect 
of political extremism on the difference between belief in upward and downward CTs, B = -
0.01, t = 0.63, p = .52 (see Table 2, Study 1, Model 1). H5 is therefore not corroborated, and 
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we cannot exclude the possibility that upward and downward conspiracy beliefs might both 
be associated with political extremism. 
H6 predicted that belief in upward CTs would be associated with political extremism. In 
support of the hypothesis, introducing political extremism at Step 2 of the hierarchical 
regression (after political orientation, see Table 3) revealed that political extremism 
significantly predicted belief in upward CTs, B = 0.04, t = 3.07, p = .002, ΔR2 = .01, 
suggesting that participants with an extreme political orientation tended to endorse this type 
of beliefs more than moderates. Surprisingly, but congruent with the interaction analysis, a 
positive quadratic effect was also observed for downward CTs, B = 0.05, t = 3.94, p < .001, 
ΔR2 = .02, suggesting the same pattern. 
 Despite being widely used, testing a U-shaped relationship using quadratic regression 
has important limitations. Depending on the actual shape of the tested relationship, this 
method can lead to important rates of false positives or false negatives (Simonsohn, 2018). 
Hence, to test the robustness of this U-shaped relationship, we carried out the “two lines test” 
(Simonsohn, 2018) in order to verify if the quadratic regression actually captured the 
hypothesized U-shaped relationship.  
The rationale of the test is to split the distribution in two and carry out two linear 
regressions, one expected to have negative slope (on the left side of the breakpoint), and the 
other to have a positive slope (on the right side of the breakpoint, or the other way around for 
an inverted U-shaped relationship). The test was carried out using an online application 
created by Simonsohn (http://webstimate.org/twolines/). The Robin Hood Algorithm 
determined the breakpoint at 3 of the political orientation scale. On the left side of the 
breakpoint (n = 243), we found the expected negative slope, B = - .78, z = -3.8, p < .001. On 
the right side of the breakpoint (n = 543), the positive slope was not significant, B = 0.07, z = 
1.49, p = .14. Examination of the conditional means scatterplot (see Figure 1a) suggests that 
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the positive relationship between political orientation and belief in upward CTs among the 
right wing is underestimated, for there is an unexpected “bump” around the political 
orientation median point (i.e., participants self-positioning themselves in the centre of the 
political orientation scale seemed to endorse slightly more upward CTs than left and right 
wing moderates). This distribution made the Robin Hood Algorithm inadequate to determine 
the breakpoint. Based on a suggestion by Simonsohn (personal communication), we used the 
most extreme cutoff after the “bump” (political orientation >= 8, n = 149). This yielded the 
expected significant positive relationship between political orientation and belief in upward 
CTs, B = 0.82, t = 4.24, p < .001, so that far right participants endorsed more CTs than right 
wing moderates. This corroborates the hypothesized U-shaped relationship. 
As for belief in downward CTs, the two-lines test did not corroborate the U-shaped 
relationship (see Figure 1b). Indeed, the Robin Hood Algorithm set the break point at 3 on the 
political orientation scale. On the left side of the breakpoint (N = 243), instead of a negative 
slope, we found a positive one, B = 0.42, z = 8.56, p < .001. As expected, the right side of the 
breakpoint also revealed a significant and positive linear effect of political orientation on 
belief in downward CTs, B = 0.97, z = 8.1, p < .001.  
UPWARD AND DOWNWARD CONSPIRACY THEORIES  19 
Discussion 
 Even though both types of CTs were correlated, we found that congruent with our 
hypotheses, belief in downward CTs were significantly more associated with conservatism 
(measured with both the left-right scale, as well as subcomponents of conservatism) than 
belief in upward CTs. By contrast, belief in upward CTs had a U-shaped relationship with 
political orientation, suggesting a relation with political extremism, while it was not the case 
for downward CTs. Indeed, although belief in upward and downward CTs did not 
significantly differ in their relation to the quadratic term of political orientation, the two-lines 
test revealed that only belief in upward CTs had an actual U-shaped relation with political 
orientation. 
 Thus, this first study corroborates the idea that belief in upward CTs might be 
associated with power-challenging attitudes, whereas downward CTs might be more 
associated with conservative attitudes. We however observed that both types of CTs were 
robustly correlated, and positively associated with the social component of conservatism. 
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Study 2 
  A second study was conducted to replicate and extend the results of Study 1. In order to 
better capture power-challenging attitudes, we added a measure of feelings of leadership 
breakdown (i.e., the belief that the leadership of society has no legitimacy, Teymoori et al., 
2016) to complement the measure of political extremism. Thus, in subsequent studies, 
conservative attitudes were assessed with the left-right scale and the dimensions of 
conservatism, and power-challenging attitudes were assessed with political extremism 
(captured through a U-shaped relationship with political orientation) and leadership 
breakdown.  
 We tested the same hypotheses as in Study 1. In addition, we tested whether upward 
and downward CTs had significantly different relations with our second measure of power-
challenging attitudes, that is, feelings of leadership breakdown (H7). We expected that belief 
in upward CTs would be positively associated with this variable (H8), more than belief in 
downward CTs.  
 Last, we included a validated measure of generic conspiracist beliefs, namely, the 
single item conspiracy beliefs scale (SICBS, Lantian et al., 2016), to examine associations 
between general conspiracy beliefs and both upward and downward conspiracy beliefs. 
Method 
Participants 
The survey was completed by 912 Belgian residents recruited in January 2019 using a 
Facebook advertisement targeting Belgian residents. In order to avoid an over-representation 
of retired people, the advertisement exclusively targeted participants above the age of 18, and 
under the age of 60. Seven hundred and seventy-seven participants remained in the sample 
after excluding those who incorrectly answered the two attention checks and the seriousness 
check or were under 18 years old (361 women and 416 men). One hundred and sixty-three 
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participants were students (21%), 353 were employees (45.4%), 63 were self-employed 
(8.1%), 73 were unemployed (9.4%), 33 were retired (4.2%), and the remaining participants 
ticked the box “other” (11.9%). The mean age was 40.2 years old (SD = 14.6), and the mean 
political orientation was 5.31 (SD = 2.29) from a scale ranging from 1 (far left) to 11 (far 
right). For a power of .90, the sample size enabled to detect an effect size of r = .12 with two 
tailed tests. 
Procedure and Materials 
Study 2 followed the same procedure as Study 1, except that the questionnaire was 
slightly longer with the inclusion of the additional variables. The questionnaire included the 
following scales, in this order: leadership breakdown, dimensions of conservatism, 
conspiracy beliefs, single item conspiracist beliefs (Lantian et a., 2016), and 
sociodemographic questions. 
 Upward (α = .84) and Downward CTs (r = .38, p < .001). We used the same scales 
as in Study 1. Participants rated their level of agreement with the items on a scale ranging 
from 1 (completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree). The two factors model returned a 
satisfactory fit, Chisq/df = 4.55, CFI = .97, RMSEA= .07, SRMR = 0.04. As in Study 1, the 
two types of CTs were positively correlated, r = .34, p < .001. Contrary to the previous study, 
a single factor structure returned insufficient fit, Chisq/df = 10.69, CFI = .92, SRMR = .06, 
RMSEA = .11.  
 Leadership Breakdown (Collange et al., 2021, α = .94). This scale consists of 10 
items measuring the belief that society’s leadership is not legitimate and does not pursue the 
common good nor cares about the most vulnerable (e.g., “The government works towards the 
welfare of people”; “The political system privileges the protection of vulnerable people”; “the 
political system is legitimate”; “the political system works as it should”, all reversed). The 
scale was adapted from Teymoori et al. (2016) by Collange et al. (2021) for the French 
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context. Participants answered on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(7). 
 Adapted Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2013). We removed 
the items that did not fit in the factor structure in Study 1, and added items to capture the 
three dimensions that emerged from the factor analysis: economic conservatism (“free 
market”, “limited government”, “business”, “diminution of state expenses”, “capitalism”, 
“planned economy” [reversed], “taxes” [reversed], α = .75 after removing the reversed 
items), social conservatism (“religious education”, “traditional marriage”, “traditional 
values”, “patriotism”, “traditional family”, α = .79) and hostility against redistribution 
(“welfare subsidies”, “wealth redistribution”, “welfare state”, “free healthcare for the most 
precarious”, all reversed, α = .80). Participants rated how they felt about those concepts on a 
scale from 1 (very negative) to 9 (very positive). Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that 
the fit of the model was poor, Chisq/df = 8.32, CFI = .81, TLI = .78, RMSEA= .10, SRMR = 
0.11. After removing the reversed items “planned economy” and “taxes” from the “economic 
conservatism” dimension, the fit of the factor structure became acceptable, Chisq/df = 4.38, 
CFI = .93, TLI = .91, RMSEA= .07, SRMR = 0.06.  
 Single Item Conspiracy Beliefs Scale (Lantian et al., 2016). This scale begins with 
participants reading a short paragraph (“Some political and social events are debated (for 
example 09/11 attacks, the death of Lady Diana […]). It is suggested that the “official 
version” of these events could be an attempt to hide the truth to the public. […]”). After 
reading, participants are asked to rate the following statement on a scale ranging from 1 
(completely false) to 9 (completely true): “I think that the official version of the events given 
by the authorities very often hides the truth”. 
 Sociodemographic information: gender, age, occupation, political orientation (1 = far 
left, 11 = far right), and seriousness check.  
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Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are displayed in Table 4.  
Table 4.  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2) 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Conservatism 
 As in Study 1, political orientation was a significant predictor of the difference between 
belief in upward and downward CTs, B = -.57, t = -17.11, p < .001 (see Table 2, Study 2, 
Model 1). In other words, beliefs in upward and downward CTs had significantly distinct 
relations with the left-right scale. 
 H2 was that we would find a linear relationship between belief in downward CTs and 
political orientation. Congruent with this hypothesis, belief in downward CTs was 
significantly predicted by a right-wing political orientation, B = 0.51, t = 16.36, p < .001, ΔR2 
= .26 (see Table 5). By contrast, we failed to observe a linear relationship between political 
orientation and belief in upward CTs, B = -.06, t = -1.89, p = .059, ΔR2 = .004.  
Table 5  
Hierarchical Regression: Political Orientation (Linear and Quadratic) and Belief in CTs 
(Study 2) 
 The same pattern of results was observed for the components of conservatism. Belief in 
downward CTs were (again) significantly more related to the social dimension of 
conservatism, B = -0.39, t = -8.15, p < .001, than belief in upward CTs (see Table 2, Study 2, 
Model 2). Indeed, belief in downward CTs was robustly correlated with the social component 
of conservatism, r = .40, 95% CI [.34; .46], p < .001, while belief in upward CTs was 
unrelated to this dimension, r = -.00, 95% CI [-.07; .07], p = .97. Belief in upward and 
downward CTs also had distinct relation with the economic dimension of conservatism, B = -
0.44, t = -9.42, p < .001. Belief in downward CTs was positively associated with economic 
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conservatism, r = .19, 95% CI [.12; .26] p < .001, while belief in upward CTs was negatively 
correlated to this dimension, r = -.29, 95% CI [-.36; -.22], p < .001. Finally, both types of 
conspiracy beliefs had significantly different relationships with hostility against 
redistribution, B = -0.20, t = -5.45, p < .001. Belief in downward CTs was more associated 
with this dimension, r = .36, 95% CI [.30; .42], p < .001, than belief in downward CTs, r = 
.19, 95% CI [.12; .26], p < .001. These results corroborate H3 and H4. 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Power-Challenging Attitudes 
 As in Study 1, the quadratic term of political orientation was not a significant predictor 
of the difference between beliefs in upward and downward CTs, B = -0.01, t = -0.49, p = .62 
(see Table 2, Study 2, Model 1), suggesting that upward and downward conspiracy beliefs do 
not have a significantly different relation to political extremism. H5 is therefore not 
corroborated. 
 H6 was that belief in upward CTs would have a positive U-shaped relationship with 
political orientation. Step 2 of the hierarchical regression revealed the expected quadratic 
effect of political orientation, B = 0.03, t = 2.25, p = .025, ΔR2 = .006 (see Table 5). We also 
found a significant quadratic effect of political orientation for belief in downward CTs, B = 
0.03, t = 2.81, p = .005.  
 As in Study 1, we tested if the quadratic regression captured the hypothesized U-shaped 
relationship using the “two lines test” (Simonsohn, 2018). The breakpoint was determined at 
4 on the political orientation scale (see Figure 2a). The left side of the breakpoint showed the 
expected negative relationship between political orientation and belief in upward CTs, B = -
0.32, z = -2.58, p = .01. As for the right side of the breakpoint, we observed no significant 
positive slope, B = 0.02, z = 0.36, p = .72. However, as in Study 1, there was an unexpected 
“bump” at the median point of the political orientation scale, so that participants ticking the 
central value of the scale endorsed slightly more upward CTs. Using an alternative cutoff 
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before the “bump” (political orientation <= 8, N = 139), we observed the expected positive 
relationship between political orientation and upward CTs, B = 0.41, t = 2.14, p = .034, so 
that far right participants endorsed these beliefs more than moderate right participants. Hence, 
far right and far left participants endorsed upward CTs more than moderates of the same 
political wing. This corroborates H3 and replicates results from Study 1.  
  
 As for belief in downward CTs, the two lines test revealed that on the left side of the 
breakpoint (set at 7 on the political orientation scale), the slope was positive, B = 0.43, z = 
9.79, p < .001, as it was on the right side of the break point, B = 0.85, z = 7.21, p < .001 (see 
Figure 2b). Thus, despite a significant quadratic regression coefficient, there was no U-
shaped relationship between political orientation and downward CTs. 
 Finally, congruent with H7 and H8, belief in upward CTs were significantly more 
associated with feelings of leadership breakdown, r = .56, 95% CI [.51; .61], p < .001, than 
with belief in downward CTs, r = .18, 95% CI [.12; .25], p < .001 (see Table 2, Study 2, 
Model 3, for the interaction analysis corroborating H7). 
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 Additional Analyses. The Single Item Conspiracy Beliefs Scale was a significant 
predictor of the difference between upward and downward conspiracy beliefs, B = 0.21, t = 
6.23, p < .001, suggesting significantly different relations. Specifically, the single item 
conspiracist beliefs scale was more associated with belief in upward CTs, r = .67, 95% CI 
[.62; .70], p < .001, than with belief in downward CTs, r = .35, 95% CI [.28; .41], p < .001. 
Finally, a hierarchical regression with the linear and quadratic terms of political orientation as 
independent variables revealed that the SICBS was not predicted by political orientation, B = 
0.01, t = -0.18, p = .85, nor by political extremism, B = 0.02, t = 1.10, p = .27.  
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicated and extended results from Study 1. As expected, belief in downward 
CTs was strongly associated with a conservative ideology, whereas upward conspiracy 
beliefs were characterized by a U-shaped relationship with political orientation, as well as a 
strong relationship with feelings of leadership breakdown. Note that downward conspiracy 
beliefs were also positively associated with feelings of leadership breakdown, though to a 
much lesser extent. Similarly, upward conspiracy beliefs were more strongly associated with 
the general conspiracy belief measure than downward conspiracy beliefs. 
Study 3 
 In Study 3, we attempted to replicate results from Studies 1-2 using a different 
measure of upward and downward conspiracy beliefs. Indeed, CT inventories have 
limitations, and notably, the choice and wording of the items can substantially affect the 
results (Clemm van Hohenberg, 2020).  We therefore designed a measure of conspiracy 
beliefs that would not be influenced by the wording of individual items, nor by the arbitrary 
choice of the conspiring groups. Moreover, this new measure addresses the issue of the low 
reliability of the scale measuring downward CTs used in Studies 1-2. 
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In this study, we also did not make self-positioning on the left-right scale mandatory. 
Thus, the analyses involving this variable were carried out only on participants who felt they 
could position themselves on this scale. The fact that self-positioning on the political 
orientation scale was mandatory in Studies 1-2 might explain the higher scores of conspiracy 
beliefs among participants ticking the central value of the scale (i.e., the “bump” found when 
carrying out the two lines test). Indeed, this value might be ticked by default by participants 
who reject this measure of political orientation. 
Method 
Participants  
The survey was completed by 871 Belgian residents recruited in August 2020 using a 
Facebook advertisement, out of whom 805 remained after excluding those who did not 
answer correctly to the attention check, seriousness check, or were under 18 years old (513 
males, 286 females, 6 “other”). The mean age was 50 years old (SD = 13.5). Seventy-four 
were students (9.1%), 354 were employees (44%), 72 were self-employed (8.9%), 62 were 
unemployed (7.7%), 140 were retired (17.4%), and the remaining 103 ticked the option 
“other” (12.9%). Six hundred and forty-four participants (80% of the sample) positioned 
themselves on the 9-point left-right political orientation scale (M = 4.60, SD = 2.13). For a 
given power of .90, the sample size enabled us to detect effect sizes of r = .11 (for N = 805) 
and r = .13 (N = 644). 
Procedure and Materials 
Study 3 followed the same procedure as Studies 1-2. Complete scales, analyses files, 
and pdf version of the questionnaire are all available on the OSF. The order of the scales was 
randomized, with the exception of sociodemographic variables which were presented on the 
last page of the questionnaire. Participants completed the following scales: 
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 Social and Economic Conservatism Scale. We used the same scale as in Study 2, and 
as in the original study (Everett, 2013), participants positioned themselves on an 11-point 
feeling thermometer ranging from 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). Given that the 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis returned an insufficient fit, chisq/df = 7.5, p < .001, CFI = .87, 
SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .09, four items were removed (“limited government”, “limitation of 
public expenses (to reduce the public debt)”, “catholic religious schools”, “religious 
marriage”). The final dimensions consisted of economic conservatism (“capitalism”, “Free 
market”, “business”, α = .71), social conservatism (“traditional values”, “patriotism”, 
“traditional family”, α = .79), and hostility against redistribution (“welfare benefits for the 
poorest”, “welfare state”, “wealth redistribution”, “free healthcare for the poorest”, α = .82). 
This solution returned a good fit, chisq/df = 5.13, CFI = .95, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .07.  
 Upward and Downward Conspiracy Beliefs. In a pilot study (N = 234, see online 
supplements for detailed description of the study), we created a measure of conspiracy beliefs 
that would not be influenced by the wording of individual items. This measure consisted of 
an introductory paragraph: “Some groups are suspected of engaging in secret activities for the 
benefit of their group, to the detriment of the rest of society. These benefits can be economic 
(e.g., money, settling positions in society) or symbolic (e.g., impose or deconstruct norms or 
ideas). Please rate the extent to which you consider it likely that the members of the 
following groups are secretly working against the majority for their own profit.”  
 Participants then rated on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely 
likely) five relatively powerful groups (European Union, International Monetary Fund, the 
government, politicians, the Army), and five relatively powerless groups (Muslims, migrants, 
Roma, LGBT+ lobbies, feminist lobbies). A third set of groups emerged from an Exploratory 
Factor Analysis in the pilot study (see online supplements) and was included for exploratory 
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analyses. These five groups included foreign powers and tech companies (Saudi government, 
Russian government, Chinese government, Facebook and Amazon).  
 Confirmatory Factor Analysis for a three-factor structure did not return a sufficient fit, 
chisq/df = 13.05, p < .001, CFI = .83, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .12. An Exploratory Factor 
Analysis without the Amazon and Facebook items returned a four-factor structure with an 
acceptable fit, chisq/df = 8.53, p < .001, CFI = .91, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .10: upward 
CTs, downward “gender” CTs (LGBT+ and feminists, r = .65, p < .001), downward 
“immigrants” CTs (Muslims, migrants, and Romas, α = .82), and foreign governments 
(Russian government, Chinese government, Saudi Arabia government, α = .82). Note that 
conceptually, this fourth factor could be considered as upward CTs. Given that gender and 
immigrants CTs were substantially correlated, r = .54, 95% CI [.49; .59], p < .001, these 
scales were combined for the confirmatory analyses (α = .83). Correlations between other 
dimensions ranged from r = .17, 95% CI [.10; .23], p < .001 (between gender and foreign 
government conspiracy beliefs) to r = .39, 95% CI [.33; .45], p < .001 (between “immigrants” 
and “powerful groups” conspiracy beliefs). 
 Participants also completed the 10 items of the leadership breakdown scale used in 
Study 2 (α = .93). At the end of the questionnaire, participants reported their gender 
(M/F/Other), age, professional situation, level of education, political orientation, subjective 
socioeconomic status, and completed the single item conspiracy beliefs scale. The 
questionnaire ended with the seriousness check. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations are displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 3) 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Conservative Attitudes 
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 As in the previous studies, we first tested if upward and downward CTs had distinct 
relation with political orientation. In line with H1, it was the case, B = -0.33, t = -10.64, p < 
.001 (see Table 2, Study 3, Model 1). Congruent with our expectations, there was a strong 
linear relation between political orientation and downward CTs, B = 0.34, t = 12.09, p < .001, 
R2 = .19 (see Table 7). Conversely, no linear relationship was found for belief in upward CTs, 
B = 0.03, t = 0.95, p = .34, ΔR2 = .00. 
Table 7  
Hierarchical Regressions on Belief in Upward CTs and Downward CTs (Study 3) 
 As in Studies 1-2, downward and upward conspiracy beliefs had significantly distinct 
relationships with social conservatism, B = -0.11, t = -4.89, p < .001 (see Table 2, Study 3, 
Model 2). Belief in downward CTs were more strongly correlated with social conservatism, r 
= .35, 95% CI [.29; .41], p < .001, than belief in upward CTs, r = .13, 95% CI [.06; .20], p < 
.001. Downward and upward conspiracy beliefs also had significantly distinct relationships 
with economic conservatism, B = -0.13, t = -4.71, p < .001. Specifically, 
belief in downward CTs were positively correlated with this dimension, r = .11, 95% CI [.04; 
.17], p = .002, while belief in upward CTs were negatively associated with this dimension, r 
= -.16, 95% CI [-.09; -.23], p < .001. Finally, both types of conspiracy beliefs had also 
significantly distinct relations with hostility against redistribution, B = -0.15, t = -6.61, p < 
.001. Belief in downward CTs was robustly associated with hostility against redistribution, r 
= .29, 95% CI [.23; .35], p < .001, while belief in upward CTs was unrelated to this 
dimension, r = .06, 95% CI [-.01; .13], p = .07. These results corroborate H3 and H4. 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Power Challenging Attitudes 
 As expected, and supporting H5, belief in upward and downward CTs had distinct 
relation with political extremism, B = 0.03, t = 2.14, p = .032 (see Table 2, Study 3, Model 1). 
Congruent with H6, the quadratic term of political orientation significantly predicted upward 
conspiracy beliefs, B = 0.05, t = 3.93, p < .001, ΔR2 = .02 (see Table 7). By contrast, the 
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quadratic term of political orientation did not significantly predict downward conspiracy 
beliefs, B = 0.02, t = 1.59, p = .11, ΔR2 = .003. 
 For upward conspiracy beliefs, the two lines test set the breakpoint at 4 on the political 
orientation scale. On the left side of the breakpoint, we observed the expected negative slope, 
B = -0.29, z = -3.1, p = .002 (see Figure 3a). The right side of the breakpoint was associated 
with a positive slope, B = 0.16, z = 2.81, p = .005. This corroborates the U-shaped 
relationship.  
 
 Last, congruent with H7 and H8, we found that feelings of leadership breakdown had a 
significantly stronger relationship with upward conspiracy beliefs, r = .50, 95% CI [.45; .55], 
p < .001, than with downward conspiracy beliefs, r = .19, 95% CI [.12; .26], p < .001 (see 
Table 2, Study 3, Model 3, for the interaction analysis). 
Additional Analyses  
 The SICBS significantly predicted the difference between upward and downward 
conspiracy beliefs, B = 0.08, t = 3.29, p = .001, suggesting different relations. Just like in 
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Study 2, the single item conspiracist beliefs scale was significantly more associated with 
belief in upward CTs, r = .42, 95% CI [.37; .48], p < .001, than with belief in downward CTs, 
r = .26, 95% CI [.19; .32], p < .001. A hierarchical regression with the linear and quadratic 
terms of political orientation as independent variables revealed that just like upward 
conspiracy beliefs, the SICBS was not predicted by the linear term of political orientation, B 
= 0.03, t = 0.68, p = .49, but was predicted by political extremism, B = 0.08, t = 4.12, p < 
.001. The two-lines test corroborated a U-shaped relation, with a negative slope on the right 
side of the breakpoint (set at 6 on the political orientation scale), B = -0.18, z = -2.41, p = 
.016, and a positive slope on the right side, B = 0.86, z = 4.86, p < .001 (see Figure 3b). 
 Last, we examined how conspiracy beliefs targeting powerful foreign governments 
(Russia, China, Saudi Arabia) were predicted by the linear and quadratic term of political 
orientation. The linear term of political orientation was not a significant predictor, B = 0.03, t 
= 0.81, p = .42. Interestingly, the quadratic term was a negative predictor, B = -0.03, t = -
2.64, p = .008, suggesting an inverted U-shaped relation. The trend, however, was too weak 
to return significant results with the two lines test. Indeed, the positive slope on the left side 
of the break point (set at 5 on the political orientation scale) was not significant, B = 0.09, z = 
1.39, p = .17, and neither was the negative slope on the right side, B = -0.11, z = -1.56, p = 
.12 (see Figure 3c). Interestingly, this dimension was not related to the single item conspiracy 
beliefs scale, r = .04, 95% CI [-.03; .11], p = .31.  
General Discussion 
 In this research, we sought to examine whether belief in CTs targeting relatively 
powerful groups (upward CTs) and relatively powerless groups (downward CTs) are 
associated with distinct ideological underpinnings. Following early theorization of the 
conspiracist mindset, we hypothesized that upward conspiracy beliefs would be associated 
with power-challenging attitudes (i.e., political extremism and feelings of leadership 
UPWARD AND DOWNWARD CONSPIRACY THEORIES  33 
breakdown in our studies), and that downward conspiracy beliefs would be associated with 
conservative attitudes (i.e., right wing political orientation, and the components of 
conservatism). Doing so, we sought to add nuance to the claim that conspiracy beliefs are a 
relatively homogeneous phenomenon that can be captured by a single construct. 
 Congruent with our expectations, and across all studies, upward conspiracy beliefs were 
significantly more associated with power-challenging attitudes than downward CTs. 
Conversely, downward conspiracy beliefs were significantly more associated with 
conservative attitudes than belief in upward CTs. Upward conspiracy beliefs were 
characterized by a U-shaped relationship with political orientation and a strong relationship 
with feelings of leadership breakdown. The latter is not surprising, since many upward CTs 
directly accuse political groups of conspiring for their own benefit. Thus, as expected, this 
type of CTs seems to be tightly related to the rejection of power structures.  
 By contrast, belief in downward CTs was characterized by a strong relationship with a 
right-wing political orientation, the social dimension of conservatism, and hostility against 
wealth redistribution. These beliefs were also positively and modestly associated with 
feelings of leadership breakdown; however, crucially, conservative attitudes were better 
predictors of the endorsement of these beliefs than power-challenging attitudes or the 
measure of generic conspiracist beliefs used in Studies 2-3.  
 Note that our results do not support the idea that downward and upward conspiracy 
beliefs are entirely distinct phenomena. Across all studies, both types of conspiracy beliefs 
were positively correlated even though they targeted radically different groups. This is 
congruent with past research (Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007) and supports the existence 
of the construct of a “conspiracist mindset”. However, our results corroborate the idea that 
upward and downward conspiracy beliefs might partly have distinct ideological 
underpinnings, and bring two nuances to the “single construct” approach to CTs.  
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 First, our findings question the assumption that generic measures of conspiracy beliefs 
adequately capture individuals’ propensity to believe in any kind of CT. In this regard, we 
note that in Studies 2-3, the single item conspiracist beliefs scale was a significantly stronger 
predictor of upward conspiracy beliefs than of downward conspiracy beliefs (a finding that 
replicates Dyrendal et al., 2018). Since this measure explicitly targets authorities and so 
called “mainstream” media, it is not surprising that it better captures conspiracy beliefs 
targeting relatively powerful groups than those related to relatively powerless groups. 
However, this disproportionate focus on powerful groups (e.g., governments, intelligence 
services, secret organizations controlling world events, and so on) is common in measures of 
individual propensity to believe in CTs (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2014; 
Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Thus, these measures might not capture individuals’ propensity to 
believe in any CT, but rather, mainly in upward CTs. 
 Second, and relatedly, our results question the idea that a generalized “conspiracist 
mindset” can be characterized as a power-challenging ideology. Such a power-challenging 
approach seems to be relevant to investigate belief in upward CTs, but it seems to be less the 
case for downward CTs. Thus, if a conspiracist mindset is defined as the individual 
propensity to believe in any kind of CT, we believe it should not be assumed that such 
propensity is primarily characterized as power-challenging. It appears that the ideological 
underpinning of one’s endorsement of CTs seems to partly differ depending on the type of 
groups CTs target.  
 This research also empirically corroborates the theoretical distinction between the 
upward and downward trends of research on CTs whose origin can be traced back to, 
respectively, the conspiracy theory of society analyzed by Popper (1945; 2002) and the 
conspiracy mentality theorized by Moscovici (1987). Indeed, even if CTs implicating 
relatively powerful groups and those implicating relatively powerless groups are correlated, 
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they still seem to be relatively distinct phenomena, underpinned by distinct ideological 
attitudes. Hence, research on CTs might benefit by explicitly acknowledging the existence of 
this distinction.  
 In our view, such acknowledgement is even more necessary given that these two trends 
of research tend to implicitly endorse slightly different definitions of “conspiracy theory”, 
that might cause misunderstandings. For example, proponents of the “Popperian view” might 
object that downward CTs are not “real” CTs. Indeed, the idea that relatively powerless 
groups might be accused of successfully pulling off a large-scale conspiracy without being 
uncovered might sound somewhat contradictory (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020). We argue that 
the validity of such objection depends on one’s definition of conspiracy theory. In this regard, 
we believe that currently, two types of definitions are mobilized in research on CTs. 
 On the one hand, if one defines “conspiracy theory” as a belief that groups are 
colluding in secret to achieve a hidden malevolent goal (e.g., Zonis & Joseph, 1994), CTs 
might virtually involve any group that might be suspected of conspiring, regardless of the 
group’s actual power. Ultimately, such a definition encompasses any accusations of 
conspiracy, in any intergroup context. Such a broad definition follows the view of Moscovici 
(1987) and is carried on by some contemporary authors (e.g., Bale, 2007; Keeley, 1999; van 
Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018).  
 On the other hand, proponents of the conspiracy theory of society adopt, explicitly or 
implicitly, a relatively different definition. While the former, broader definition is centered on 
the idea that an outgroup is conspiring against the ingroup, this definition is centered on the 
belief that behind significant social events, there is a powerful evil group steering the wheel 
(Douglas et al., 2019; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Popper, 2002). If one endorses such a 
definition of a CT, it indeed becomes unlikely that an objectively powerless groups can be the 
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target of a CT, because successfully carrying out a conspiracy demands considerable power 
(e.g., to exert censorship on the “mainstream” media). 
 In sum, rather than discarding the possibility that relatively powerless groups might be 
the target of CTs, we argue that it would be better to consider these beliefs as derived from 
partially distinct conceptualizations of CTs, and acknowledge that CTs are a multifaceted 
phenomenon. As such, CTs might be motivated by a diversity of ideological attitudes, just as 
they might fulfill distinct psychological needs (Douglas et al., 2017; Sternisko et al., 2020; 
Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007). 
 Finally, even though they are underpinned by different ideological attitudes, upward 
and downward CTs might have in common a distorted perception of the target groups’ 
power. Indeed, in downward CTs, relatively powerless groups are endowed with power and 
willingness to conspire through motivated reasoning (Moscovici, 1987). Similarly, many 
authors have argued that in CTs (specifically in upward CTs), conspirators are perceived as 
preternaturally powerful (Bale, 2007; Brotherton, 2012; Popper; 1966). Thus, both upward 
and downward CTs seem to be associated with a distorted perception of power. Ultimately, it 
appears that the level of power held by a group is not a necessary precondition for a CT to 
target it. Rather, endowment with power might be part of the very fabric of a CT.  
Limitations and Perspectives 
 The first and main limitation is the exploratory nature of most of the reported results. 
Indeed, this article went through multiple rewritings and deviated from the pre-registered 
hypotheses based on past reviews as well as changes in theoretical framing. Nonetheless, the 
stability of the results across the three studies suggests that the relations between political 
attitudes and the two types of conspiracy theories considered in this paper is robust.   
 A second limitation is that we did not measure perceived power for the various 
conspiring groups, but instead chose CTs based on whether the group held power in society. 
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Future research could examine if objectively powerful and powerless groups are also 
perceived as such at the psychological level. If CTs are associated with a distorted perception 
of power, the articulation between objective and perceived power deserves further, and 
detailed, investigation. 
 Regarding this issue, we also note that the exploratory factor analysis in Study 3 
suggests that at the psychological level, the multidimensionality of conspiracy beliefs might 
not be organized solely based on perceived power – as, for example, “gender” conspiracy 
beliefs and “immigrants” conspiracy beliefs loaded on distinct (yet robustly correlated) 
factors. A parsimonious (but conceptually less precise) alternative would be that conspiracy 
beliefs are organized based on prejudice (e.g., groups disliked by conservatives, or by 
extremists). Note that a factor structure based on prejudice is not incompatible with a factor 
structure based on power, as individuals holding power-challenging attitudes might be 
prejudiced against powerful groups, and individuals holding conservative attitudes might be 
prejudiced against powerless groups. 
 We must also highlight that the distinction between (power-challenging) upward and 
(conservative) downward conspiracy beliefs has limitations. Notably, some CTs targeting 
relatively powerful groups are clearly underpinned by conservative concerns (e.g., CTs about 
climate change). Moreover, in some intergroup contexts, the power balance between the 
believer in the CT and the alleged conspirator might not be clearly asymmetrical. The 
approach developed in this paper does not have clear predictions regarding such “horizontal” 
CTs. Similarly, CTs targeting Jewish people seem ambiguous with regard to this distinction, 
as Jews are stigmatized in many countries but are also high in status.  
 On more general notes, we can mention the cross-sectional design of the studies, 
which limits conclusions regarding causality. People may develop ideological beliefs that 
reflect their conspiracy beliefs, but the reverse may hold as well. Experimental or 
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longitudinal studies might allow researchers to draw more robust conclusions regarding 
causality. A second limitation is the use of a convenience sample recruited using Facebook 
advertisements. While this approach enables researchers to target a specific audience and to 
control the validity of the responses using attention and seriousness checks, this may also 
result in specific biases in the recruitment of participants (Goldberg et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 
2018). Examining if our results hold in a more carefully constituted sample (e.g., a nationally 
representative sample) would surely be a substantial contribution to research. Similarly, 
examining whether these results replicate in a different national context (i.e., non-French 
speaking Belgium) would be a valuable contribution.  
 Last, for our hypotheses regarding belief in upward and downward CTs, we used 
measures of conspiracy beliefs that were not validated by prior research. This approach is 
justified by the fact that no existing scale enabled us to clearly make this distinction. 
Nevertheless, replicating these results after validating a scale tapping into these 
subdimensions of CTs might enable us to draw more robust conclusions.  
Conclusion 
 In this research, we provided evidence that belief in CTs implicating relatively 
powerful groups and relatively powerless groups are positively correlated but have distinct 
relationships with power-challenging and conservative attitudes, and with a generic measure 
of conspiracy beliefs. These differential relations highlight the existence of diverging trends 
of research on CTs, which assume different mechanisms of endorsement as well as different 
definitions of CTs. We believe that being (self-)conscious about the diverging trends of 
research on CTs, as well as the diverging conceptualizations of CTs and the notion of 
conspiracy mindset, might help clarify and refine one’s understanding of CTs, avoid 
overgeneralizations in future research, and reflect about how distorted power perception 
might play a role in the yet-to-be clearly conceptualized, “conspiracist mindset”. 
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Table 1 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 1) 
 
Note. HAR stands for Hostility Against Redistribution. 
*p < .05 **p < .01  
 
Table 2  
Difference between Upward and Downward Conspiracy Beliefs as Dependent Variable 
(Studies 1-3) 
 
Note. HAR stands for Hostility Against Redistribution. 
* p < .05 **  p  < .01 
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Table 3  
Hierarchical Regressions for Belief in Upward and Downward CTs (Study 1) 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2) 
 
Note. HAR stands for Hostility Against Redistribution. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 5  
Hierarchical Regression: Political Orientation (Linear and Quadratic) and Belief in CTs 
(Study 2) 
 
* p < . 05 ** p < .01 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 3) 
 
Note. HAR stands for Hostility Against Redistribution. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 7  
Hierarchical Regressions on Belief in Upward CTs and Downward CTs (Study 3) 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
